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Abstract
We consider a setting where n buyers, with combinatorial preferences over m items, and a seller,
running a priority-based allocation mechanism, repeatedly interact. Our goal, from observing limited
information about the results of these interactions, is to reconstruct both the preferences of the buyers
and the mechanism of the seller. More specifically, we consider an online setting where at each stage, a
subset of the buyers arrive and are allocated items, according to some unknown priority that the seller
has among the buyers. Our learning algorithm observes only which buyers arrive and the allocation
produced (or some function of the allocation, such as just which buyers received positive utility and
which did not), and its goal is to predict the outcome for future subsets of buyers. For this task, the
learning algorithm needs to reconstruct both the priority among the buyers and the preferences of each
buyer. We derive mistake bound algorithms for additive, unit-demand and single minded buyers. We
also consider the case where buyers’ utilities for a fixed bundle can change between stages due to different
(observed) prices. Our algorithms are efficient both in computation time and in the maximum number
of mistakes (both polynomial in the number of buyers and items).
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1 Introduction
A collection of lobbyists enter a politician’s office. An hour later, they emerge, some happy and some
unhappy. The next day, a different subset of lobbyists enter, and again some emerge happy and some
unhappy. Suppose that what is happening is that the politician has a collection of m favors (items) to
distribute, along with a priority ordering over lobbyists; the lobbyists are single-minded, each lobbyist i with
a demand-set Di ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}. The politician orders the lobbyists who arrived that day by priority and
hands each one Di if it is still available (making the lobbyist happy) or handing her nothing if Di is no
longer available (making the lobbyist unhappy). Can we reconstruct the politician’s priority ordering and
the lobbyists’ demand-sets (or at least, given a set of lobbyists, predict which will end up happy and which
unhappy, since we cannot observe the items themselves) from these types of observations?
Or, in the context of computational advertising, consider a publisher that owns a web site and has some
collection of advertisers. The advertisers tell the publisher which potential impressions are relevant to them
(are they interested in this type of impression), their bid (the value they are willing to pay for a relevant
impression) and conflicts (which competing advertisers they refuse to appear concurrently with, for example,
competing car makers for a car ad). Each time a user visits a webpage, the publisher’s ad server considers
the subset of relevant advertisers. It then orders the advertisers (say, by their bid) and greedily assigns
an impression to an advertiser if it does not introduce a conflict (otherwise it skips this advertiser). From
observing which advertisements are shown and which are not, and knowing which advertisers are relevant,
can we learn the conflicts and priority ordering?
In this paper, we consider this and several closely related problems. Formally, we assume there are n
buyers (lobbyists or advertisers) and a mechanism (the politician or ad server) who has a priority ordering
over buyers that is unknown to us. There is a collection ofm items, and the buyers each have utility functions
over subsets of items (e.g., the examples above correspond to the case of single-minded buyers1). At each
time-step t, some set St ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of buyers arrive. The mechanism then orders the buyers in St by
priority and allocates to each its most-preferred bundle from the collection of items not yet given to earlier
buyers in the ordering. Finally, we observe some function yt of the outcome (allocation). We will consider
the case that buyers are single-minded and yt indicates which buyers received positive utility and which did
not (as in the examples above), as well as the case that buyers are unit-demand or additive, and yt indicates
the items (if any) that each buyer received. The goal of our algorithm will be to predict yt from St, and
we will present efficient algorithms that can do so while making only a bounded (polynomial in n and m)
number of mistakes in total.
Notice that the setting of single-minded buyers can exhibit significant non-monotonicities. For example,
consider two lobbyists a and b whose demand sets Da and Db do not overlap, and with a having higher
priority than b. Depending on the other lobbyists who show up, it could be that a’s presence has no effect
on b (since their sets don’t overlap); it could be that a’s presence helps b (if there is a lobbyist c present,
with priority between a and b, such that Da ∩ Dc 6= ∅ and Dc ∩ Db 6= ∅); or, it could be that a’s presence
hurts b (if there are lobbyists d, e present with Da ∩Dd 6= ∅, Dd ∩De 6= ∅, and De ∩Db 6= ∅, with ordering
a ≻ d ≻ e ≻ b).
To get a feel for the type of results we are aiming for, we describe here a simpler case of this problem and
how one can solve it. Suppose buyers are additive rather than single-minded,2 and yt denotes the allocation
of items to the agents in St. This problem is monotonic in some sense: if St
′
⊆ St and i ∈ St
′
, then yti ⊆ y
t′
i
(including more buyers reduces the allocation for i). It is possible to solve this problem tracking two things:
first, for a given buyer i, track the set of items i has ever won, and second, an estimate the relative ordering
of the buyers ≻̂. Consider some item j that buyer i wins in some round. Buyer i will take item j whenever
it is still available, so if buyer i doesn’t win item j, we learn that buyer i is later in the ordering than the
winner of item j. To predict the allocation for a set St, we order buyers in St according to ≻̂, and in that
order, give the buyers all of the remaining items she has bought before.
1In the case of advertisers, each pairwise conflict can be modeled as an abstract item that belongs to the demand-set of both
conflicting advertisers.
2For each buyer i and each item j, either buyer i either wants j or she doesn’t, and buyer i takes all items that she wants
that are available when it is her turn. One can think of this as the behavior of additive buyers in the presence of fixed prices.
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Type of buyers Prices (fixed or variable) Mistake Bound
Single-minded fixed O(n2)
Additive fixed O(nm+ n2)
Unit-demand fixed O(n2m log(m))
Additive variable O(n2m log(V ))
Unit-demand variable O(n2MB)
Figure 1: Summary of our results; V is the maximum value any buyer has for an item andMB is the mistake
bound for the Ellipsoid algorithm. Our algorithm for single-minded buyers applies even to the case where
observations are only which buyers get their set and which do not, rather than the explicit allocation.
Our algorithm will make two types of mistakes, and we can limit the number of each. Consider the first
buyer (according to ≻̂) for whom we make a mistake in predicting her allocation. Suppose she won some
item j that we did not predict she would get. Since she was the first mistake according to ≻̂, we did not
predict that someone earlier in ≻̂ won item j. Thus, item j was available in our prediction when we reached
buyer i: we did not allocate item j to her because we had never seen her win item j before. There are at
most nm of these sorts of mistakes to make (one per item/buyer pair). Suppose instead we predicted that
some item j would be allocated to buyer i but she did not get item j. Since we predicted item j for buyer i,
buyer i must have won item j before (and is therefore interested in item j). Then, it must be the case that
buyer i is later in the true ordering than in ≻̂: the winner of item j must be earlier than buyer i. Then, we
can update ≻̂ by demoting buyer i: if done carefully, as we describe in Section 3, i will never be demoted
further than her true position in the ordering, so there will be at most n2 mistakes of this type.
1.1 Our Results
This paper presents several mistake-bound learning algorithms for ordered arrival mechanisms. The crux of
these algorithms is to learn the hidden priority order, or permutation over buyers, in a way that meshes well
with learning the players’ preferences at the same time, all in a mistake-bound framework. First, we consider
the case without prices (or equivalently, when prices are fixed across time). In the case of a single item, this
problem reduces to learning the priority order over buyers. Previous work describes how one can efficiently
sample linear extensions of partial orders [Karzanov and Khachiyan, 1991], which can be combined with a
simple halving algorithm to learn a permutation with a mistake bound of Θ(n log(n)) when mistakes are
accompanied with some pair i, j which were mis-ordered (see Section 6). When buyers have more general
valuations, however, it is not clear how to use this algorithm to learn the priority order over buyers.3 So,
we use a simpler algorithm for learning a permutation whose mistake bound is Θ(n2) (when a mistake is
accompanied by some element of the permutation that needs to be demoted rather than a pair of elements
for which the permutation was incorrect). With this algorithm in hand, we build mistake-bound learning
algorithms for single-minded, unit-demand, and additive buyers with fixed prices, and for unit-demand and
additive buyers with variable, observable prices. The precise form of these bounds is summarized in Table 1.
The results for additive and unit-demand buyers also apply to the case where there are multiple copies of
goods.
These results look quite a bit like combining online decision list learning [Helmbold et al., 1990] combined
with other forms of mistake-bound learning algorithms: in the case of unit-demand without prices, we learn
the decision list order over buyers and, for each buyer, their preference order over items; in the case of
additive buyers without prices, we learn the order over buyers and which items each person is interested
in; in the settings with prices, we use binary search or ellipsoid-style learning algorithms to understand the
players’ numeric values.
3In the case of a single item, we learn that the true winner has higher priority than everyone else. In general, mistakes don’t
give such a simple constraint on the ordering of buyers.
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1.2 Related Work
Our work is related to the literature on learning from revealed preferences [Samuelson, 1938][Varian, 2006],
which considers the problem of learning about a single buyer from observing her behavior under observed
prices. Rationalizable demands (according to some prices) are those which can arise from maximizing
some concave, monotone, continuous value function subject to a budget constraint. Beigman and Vohra
[2006] gave algorithms with finite sample complexity bounds for learning and predicting from rationalizable
demand/price pairs. Zadimoghaddam and Roth [2012] gave computationally efficient versions of these al-
gorithms for linear and linearly separable utilities. Amin et al. [2014] consider both the problem of setting
prices (minimizing regret w.r.t revenue) and the prediction problem (minimizing classification mistakes w.r.t.
exogenous prices) for the online version of this problem. Balcan et al. [2014] give tight sample complexity
results for predicting linear, separable piecewise linear concave, CES, and Leontif preferences, and extend
the results to the agnostic setting. Their results extend to indivisible goods and certain nonlinear pricing.
Our work differs from the work on revealed preferences in two key ways. One is that in the settings we
consider, each observed transaction involves multiple buyers: as a result, a buyer might not get some item
because it was not in her desired bundle, or might not get it because the item (or a complement to it) was
taken by some other buyer. The other is that we also, at the same time, are aiming to learn an unknown
priority ordering for the seller. The algorithms we derive use as subroutines algorithms that are closely
related to those for learning decision lists in a mistake bound setting Helmbold et al. [1990]. We also employ
a mistake bound learner for classification by halfspaces from Maass and Turan [1990] for efficiently learning
a classifier for a fixed unit-demand buyer.
2 Model and Preliminaries
Let B be a set of n buyers and I be a set of m items. Each buyer i ∈ B has some combinatorial valuation
vi over subsets of items T ⊆ I.An ordered arrival mechanism A consists of an ordering over buyers ≻ and
allocates items in I as follows. At each time t, an arbitrary subset St of the n buyers arrives online. Then,
in order according to ≻, each buyer in St chooses the bundle from the remaining items that maximizes her
value. So, the buyer i1 in S
t who is first according to ≻ chooses the bundle Xti1 ⊆ I of maximum value to
her, then the buyer i2 in S
t who is second according to ≻ chooses the bundle Xti2 ⊆ I \X
t
i1
of maximum
value to her, and so on.
The label yt for the example St is some function obs of the allocation (Xt1, . . . , X
t
n) = A(S
t) which arises
from this process. Our goal will be to predict yt = obs(A(St)) for a new subset St given our previous
observations. We will focus on obs = Id (the identity function; our goal is to predict the allocation) and
obs = (I[Xt1 6= ∅], . . . , I[X
t
n 6= ∅]) (the function which indicates which buyers bought at least one item; our
goal is to predict which players have positive utility).
We will be working in the mistake-bound model, where our learning algorithm A will progress as
follows. In each round, the algorithm is presented with a subset St. The algorithm’s current prediction,
A(St), will be output. Then, the algorithm observes the true label yt = obs(Xt1, . . . , X
t
n). If A(S
t) 6= yt
(the label predicted is incorrect), round t is counted as a mistake. The goal in mistake-bound learning is to
bound the worst-case total number of mistakes made over an arbitrarily long sequence of examples presented
to the algorithm. We will call this worst-case bound the mistake bound for learning algorithm A.
We also consider an extension of this setting, where each example is a pair (St, pt) of a subset of buyers
and a price vector pt ∈ Rm. Then, in order according to ≻, the buyers in St each chooses a bundle from
the remaining items maximizing her utility. We assume that their utility is quasi-linear in money, i.e., that
ui(X
t
i , p
t) = vi(X
t
i )−
∑
j∈Xt
i
pt(j) (where Xti ⊆ I represents the bundle player i chose). We call this model
the variable-price model ; the previous model, described without prices, can be thought with a fixed price
vector p which does not vary across examples. We also note that, for several of the problems we study, our
algorithms extend to the case where for each item e ∈ I, there are ke copies of that item (here, we assume
buyers are unit-demand in each item, so they will never purchase more than one copy of a given item).
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3 Single-Minded Buyers
Suppose there are n single-minded buyers. That is, each buyer i has a single demand set Di for which she
has value vi(Di) > 0. At each time t, a subset S
t ⊆ [n] arrives, and each buyer in St is offered the items
which haven’t been taken by earlier buyers. If buyer i is offered some set which includes Di, she will take
Di, otherwise she will take nothing (one can imagine infinitesimal prices giving a disincentive to take excess
items). Let W t denote the set of buyers who won their demand sets in example St (so W t = obs(A(St))).
From W t and St alone, we wish to be able to predict the winning set W t
′
for a new subset St
′
, where our
performance objective is the number of mistakes we make.
Suppose for a moment our learning algorithm knew ≻ but not the demand sets Di. From ≻ alone, we
cannot predict the sets W t
′
given St
′
: we need to understand which buyers have items in common between
their demand sets (e.g., if Di ∩ Dj 6= ∅, then i and j will not simultaneously be in any winning set). For
this reason, we will call i and j in conflict if Di ∩Dj 6= ∅. Consider the graph G(V,E) where V = [n] and
there is an edge (i, j) ∈ E iff buyers i and j have a conflict: we will call this the conflict graph. For each
pair of buyers (i, j), if i, j ∈ W t for some St, the two buyers clearly do not have a conflict. Notice that,
even if i ≻ j, there will be cases when j ∈ W t but i /∈ W t (if i has a conflict, say, with an earlier winning
buyer, but j does not). Thus, to predict whether buyer i will win, it is not sufficient to know simply who
has precedence over i and who conflicts with i: we need more complete information about the structure of
the conflict graph.
Notice that, given the conflict graph G and the ordering over buyers ≻, we can predict the winners W t
for an arbitrary subset St. In particular, buyer i wins exactly when no one before i won with whom i has a
conflict. So, we can predict the entire winning set by scanning through St in the order ≻ and adding buyer
i to W t if no conflicting buyer is already in W t. Thus, we are done if we can learn both G and ≻.
We start by presenting a mistake-bound procedure PermULearn (informally alluded to in the introduc-
tion) to learn a permutation ≻ in a model where each time it makes a mistake on its current guess ≻̂
t
, it
is told some item dt that is incorrectly above some other item r in ≻̂
t
(but is not told r). The procedure
employs a datastructure P = (≻˜, O), where ≻˜ is a permutation and O is a partition of the buyers to levels.
Given a permutation σ, let Loc(i, σ) denote the position of i in σ and let Buyer(k, S, σ) denote the name
of the kth element in σ restricted to S. The datastructure at time t is P t and we will associate P t with
its output permutation ≻̂
t
, so that Loc(i, P t) = Loc(i, ≻̂
t
). The key interface with P t will be the function
Demote(dt, P t), employed when dt is returned as a mistake (an item that is incorrectly above some other
item r in ≻̂
t
). The algorithm is quite similar to that used for learning decision lists in a mistake bound
setting [Helmbold et al., 1990]. The following lemma is used throughout the rest of our analysis.
Lemma 3.1. PermULearn, below, has a mistake-bound of O(n2) for learning a permutation ≻ in a model
where if ≻̂
t
6=≻, it is given some dt ∈ [n] such that ∃r such that dt ≻̂
t
r but r ≻ d.
Proof. Let Level(i, O) be the level of buyer i in O, i.e., Level(i, O) = j where i ∈ Oj . Let d
t be the element
given (and demoted by PermULearn) at time t. We show by induction on the algorithm’s pushing down
elements that no dt is pushed to a level below her location in ≻, i.e., Loc(i,≻) ≥ Level(i, Ot). If this is
the case, the algorithm is correct: at most n2 pushes can occur and the limit of these push-downs is some
consistent permutation. Prior to any elements being pushed down, all elements are at the first level, hence
Loc(i,≻) ≥ Level(i, O0) initially.
Now, suppose that the inductive hypothesis holds at time t− 1, i.e., for any item i we have Loc(i,≻) ≥
Level(i, Ot−1). Our induction hypothesis implies two things: first, that Loc(dt,≻) ≥ Level(dt, Ot−1) and
second, Loc(r,≻) ≥ Level(r,Ot−1)
Our assumption states that when dt is demoted, there is some element r such that Loc(dt,≻) > Loc(r,≻)
but Loc(r, P t) > Loc(dt, P t) ≥ Level(dt, Ot−1). The second implication of our induction hypothesis states,
prior to the tth demotion, Loc(r,≻) ≥ Level(r,Ot−1). Since Loc(r, P t) > Loc(dt, P t), it must be the
case that Level(r,Ot−1) ≥ Level(dt, Ot−1) (r is only given a later location in P t than dt if she is at
a weakly larger-numbered level). Thus, Loc(dt,≻) > Loc(r,≻) ≥ Level(r,Ot−1) ≥ Level(dt, Ot−1), so
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Algorithm PermULearn: Maintains level ordering
Let ≻˜ be an arbitrary ordering for tiebreaking;
* InitPerm, put all items at level 1 *
O1 = {1, . . . , n};
O2,...,n = ∅;
≻̂
0
= ≻˜;
* Permutation(P t), outputs consistent permutation *
for l = 1 to |O| do
pil = Order Ol, level l of O, according to ≻˜;
≻̂
t
= pi1 · pi2 · . . . pil the concatenation of the levels’ permutations;
* Demote(i, P t), demote buyer i *
Let k be the level in which i resides, e.g. i ∈ Ok;
Let O′k = Ok \ {i}, O
′
k+1 = Ok+1 ∪ {i};
Let O′ = (O1, . . . , Ok−1, O
′
k, O
′
k+1, Ok+1, . . .);
Let P t+1 = (≻˜, O′);
≻̂
t+1
= Permutation(P t+1);
Loc(dt,≻) > Level(dt, Ot−1) and pushing dt to level Level(dt, Ot−1) + 1 maintains the invariant. So the
algorithm is correct, and no element is pushed more than n times, implying a mistake bound of n2.
Thus, PermULearn is guaranteed to learn a consistent ordering, so long as we never request a demotion
of a buyer who shouldn’t be demoted. So, when we use this procedure, it suffices to show that we never
demote a buyer i unless there is some buyer i′ later in P t but earlier in ≻ to guarantee that we learn a
consistent ordering with at most O(n2) mistakes. We mention briefly that this can be used directly to solve
the problem of predicting f = I (the allocation is the label) for additive buyers.
Corollary 3.2. There is an algorithm with mistake bound O(nm+n2) for learning the allocation rule of an
ordered arrival mechanism when buyers are additive.
Proof. Consider the following algorithm. Initiate a permutation datastructure P , and also a n × m-
dimensional vector B[i][e] = 0. For a given subset St, in order according to P ’s current permutation, the
algorithm predicts that agent i is allocated every item which is both still available and for which B[i][e] = 1.
There are two types of errors which are made. Consider i, the first buyer (according to P ) for which we
made an error. If i wins some item e which our algorithm did not predict, then set B[i][e] = 1 (it must have
been previously B[i][e] = 0, or we would have allocated e to i). If i did not win some element e that we
predicted her to win, it must be the case that B[i][e] = 1, Loc(i, P ) < Loc(i′, P ), and Loc(i′,≻) < Loc(i,≻)
for some i′ (namely, that i′ that won e). Thus, by Lemma 3.1, it is valid to demote i. There are at most nm
errors of the first type and at most n2 of the second type.
We also briefly mention that this permutation datastructure is enough to learn in the simple case that
f = I (the allocation is the label) for single-minded buyers.
Corollary 3.3. There is an efficient algorithm for predicting f = I (the allocation) for subsets of single-
minded buyers with a mistake bound of O(n2).
Proof. Use an instantiation of the permutation datastructure P as above. For each buyer i, let Dˆi = ∅
initially. Whenever we see a buyer i win a nonempty set, set Dˆi = Xi = Di. When a subset S
t arrives,
in order according to P , allocate j ∈ St his set Dˆj if it is still available (otherwise, Xˆj = ∅). When this
allocation rule makes a mistake, consider it, the first buyer (according to the ordering P ) for which our
algorithm mis-allocated items. There are two possible mistakes: Xˆit = ∅ but Xit = Dit , or Xit = ∅ but
Xˆit = Dit . The first case can occur for two reasons: we have never seen i
t win, in which case we have
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Dˆit = ∅, so we then set Dˆit = Dit (there are at most n of these errors), or because there is some i
′ such that
it ≻ i′ but i′≻̂
t
it (who conflicts with it). But this is not possible, or i′ would be an earlier mistake. The
second kind of mistake can only occur because there is some i′ such that i′ ≻ it but it≻̂
t
i′ (it is too early in
the permutation). Thus, by Lemma 3.1, demoting it in these cases is valid and leads to a mistake bound of
O(n2). Thus, in total, there are O(n2) mistakes made by this algorithm.
It remains to show how we can use the permutation datastructure to solve our original problem, that
of learning ≻ alongside the conflict graph for single-minded buyers from the examples of winning sets. The
intuition behind our main algorithm is as follows. We will initialize the permutation datastructure and
begin by assuming the conflict graph is the complete graph. For a given estimate ≻̂ and conflict graph
Ĝ, we predict Ŵ t for St as follows. The mechanism serves members of St in order according to ≻̂ (e.g,
Loc(i, P t) < Loc(j, P t) will imply i gets served before j), subject to the constraint that if j is in conflict
with some earlier buyer who has won, j doesn’t win. Then, there will be two types of mistakes: when W t
includes some pair (i, j) connected by an edge in Ĝ, and when it does not. In the first case, we can safely
remove (i, j) from Ĝ, and in the second case we will argue that we can safely demote some buyer. We will
maintain the invariants alluded to previously: namely, that E ⊆ Ê (for edges in the conflict/current estimate
graph), and that we have never demoted a buyer who didn’t need to be demoted. Algorithm SingleMinded
formalizes this intuition.
Algorithm SingleMinded: MB algorithm for predicting winners; single-minded buyers wrt order ≻
P=InitPerm;
Let Ĝ = ([n], Ê) where (i, j) ∈ Ê for all i 6= j;
for t = 1 to T do
Receive St;
Let Ŵ t = ∅;
for b = 1 to |St| do
Let i = Buyer(b, St, P );
add i to Ŵ t if ∄j ∈ Ŵ t such that (i, j) ∈ Ê;
Predict Ŵ t;
Learn W t;
if W t 6= Ŵ t then
if ∃i, j ∈ W t such that (i, j) ∈ Ê then
Ê = Ê \ {(i, j)}
else
Let it = Buyer(1, Ŵ t \W t, P );
P = Demote(it, P );
Thm 3.4. SingleMinded is a 2n2-mistake bound algorithm for predicting W t, the winning set for single-
minded buyers.
Proof. Throughout the life of the algorithm, two invariants are maintained. First, the true set of edges in the
conflict graph E will always be contained in Ê the set of conflicts the algorithm tracks. Second, ≻̂ will only be
told to push down a buyer i when there is some j such that Loc(i,≻) > Loc(j,≻) but Loc(i, P t) < Loc(j, P t).
We proceed to show the first invariant holds. It begins with the complete conflict graph Ĝ = ([n], Ê), so
the invariant holds at the beginning. Whenever the algorithm deletes an edge (i, j) from Ĝ, an example has
been observed where two buyers are clearly not in conflict (e.g., i and j are both allocated in some example).
Now, we prove the second invariant. This is clearly true when we push some i down the first time; i
doesn’t always win when he shows up, implying he isn’t at the first level according to ≻. Now, suppose so far
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this has been the case: no buyer so far has been pushed unless there was proof according to ≻ that he is below
someone below him according to ≻̂
t−1
. Then, when it is asked to be pushed down, it is because it wasn’t
allocated to, even though ≻̂
t−1
said he should have been. This isn’t because of conflicts, by invariant 1, so
it didn’t conflict with those above him according to ≻̂
t−1
. Moreover, since it was the first person according
to ≻̂
t−1
where we made a mistake, it must conflict with someone above him according to ≻, implying there
is someone below him in ≻̂
t−1
who he is below in ≻. Thus, the invariant is maintained after it is demoted.
Thus, by Lemma 3.1, using the permutation datastructure is appropriate: it is never told to push down
some buyer who doesn’t need to be lower according to ≻, so the algorithm is correct. Finally, there can be
at most n2 edges deleted from the conflict graph, and at most n2 times where some buyer is pushed down
in the ordering. Thus, the mistake bound on this algorithm is 2n2.
Thus, this is quite an effective way to interpret the observations of “satisfied” or “not satisfied”: if the
observation was actually the allocation (and the goal to predict the allocation), the problem trivially reduces
to the n2 bound from the single-item case (it reduces to learning the priority of each buyer and seeing each
buyer win one time). If, on the other hand, the observations are simply the subset of those buyers who are
satisfied, and we aim to construct the smallest consistent model of the items corresponding to the demanded
sets, the problem becomes NP-complete.
Observation 3.5. Given a conflict graph G, finding the smallest m for which single-minded buyers over m
items suffices to describe the conflicts in G is equivalent to clique edge-cover, and is thus NP-complete. On
the other hand, there will always exist a consistent set of at most n2 items: in particular, one item for each
edge in G with each player wanting all of its incident edges.
4 Unit-demand buyers
Suppose now our n buyers are unit-demand, and we wish to predict the allocation rather than just the
winning set. When prices are fixed, this problem corresponds to each buyer having an ordering over items
>i, as well as the ordering ≻ over buyers. At each time t, a subset St arrives, and the players in St, in order
according to ≻, will each choose their favorite item remaining. For example, the first buyer in St will choose
his favorite item, the second buyer will choose his favorite that the first buyer didn’t take, and so on. By a
reduction to the single-minded case, we have the following.
Thm 4.1. Algorithm UnitDemand is an O(n2m2)-mistake bound learning algorithm for predicting the allo-
cation for subsets of buyers, when the allocation occurs according to some fixed permutation on unit-demand
buyers facing fixed prices, when the observation is the true allocation in that setting.
Proof. Consider Algorithm SingleMinded. For each player i, make m “ghost buyers” i1 . . . im, which will
correspond to embedding i’s preferences into ≻. Notice that the true allocation mechanism A can be viewed
as an ordering of the mn ghost buyers (an ordering over buyers, and within each buyer an ordering over
items) where two ghost buyers are in conflict if either they correspond to the same buyer or correspond to
the same item. Since only one of the m copies of a given buyer will be allocated to according to A, we will
never delete conflict edges between these copies, and will thus never predict two ghosts corresponding to the
same true buyer will win simultaneously. Similarly, for any item j, since the item will never simultaneously
be given to two buyers, we will never delete conflict edges corresponding to that item. Finally, for a player
in position j according to ≻, no more than j of his ghost buyers will ever be seen winning. Thus, at most j
of his ghosts will need to be rearranged by ≻ˆ. In total, then, there are only min(n2, nm) ghost buyers that
are relevant. Then, there are at most O(min(n4, n2m2)) mistakes, by Theorem 6.1.
We also briefly mention that we have a slightly tighter bound (which is computationally efficient).
Thm 4.2. Algorithm UnitDemandPrime has a mistake bound of Θ(n2m log(m)) for predicting the allocation
for subsets of buyers, when the allocation occurs according to some fixed permutation on unit-demand buyers
with fixed prices when the observation is the true allocation in that setting.
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Algorithm UnitDemand: Predicts allocation of order-based allocation rule for unit-demand players
Let U be an instantiation of Algorithm SingleMinded for nm buyers i11, i12, . . . inm;
for t = 1 to T do
Receive St;
Let S¯t = {ijk|j ∈ St, ∀k ∈ [m]}; // Convert players to ghost buyers
Let W¯ t = U(S¯t);
for j ∈ St do
Let Wˆ t(j) = k, where ijk ∈ W¯ t; // Convert ghost winners to allocation
Predict Wˆ t;
Learn W t;
if W t 6= Wˆ t then
Let Wˆ t = {ijk|W t(j) = k}; // Convert allocation to ghost winners
Give U the mistake Wˆ t;
Proof. We describe how to efficiently implement an approximate halving algorithm for learning permutations
consistent with a partial order in Section 6. If it is the first mistake, either the estimate of it’s preferences
are incorrect (in which case jit ≻it jˆit , and we add this constraint), or i
t needs to be demoted. Once ≻ˆit
becomes infeasible, all constraints added were valid, so demoting it is valid.
4.1 Multiple copies
Several of these results are easy to extend to the setting where there are multiple copies of each resource,
and players are unit-demand for multiple copies of a particular item (e.g., no player wants more than one
copy of a given item). If buyers are additive (across bundles of different items), it suffices to learn their
preferences over types of items. This can be done as in Corollary 3.2 with no loss, treating any copy of a
resource identically internal to the learning algorithm. For prediction, a buyer will take his favorite bundle
of items, and that bundle can contain an item for which there is at least one copy remaining. This implies
a mistake bound for learning the allocations which is independent of the number of copies of each item.
For unit-demand buyers, it is not clear how to use the solution from Theorem 4.1, which reduces to the
single-minded case (for buyer i to not have item e available, there would need to be ke “ghosts” that bought
item e prior to buyer i, rather than a single conflict). On the other hand, Algorithm UnitDemandPrime can
be used directly, to learn the permutation over buyers and, for each buyer i, i’s preference order over item
types.
In the case of single-minded buyers, recall that the problem is quite easy if we ever see an allocation;
Corollary 3.3 applies directly with no loss in the mistake bound. On the other hand, if no allocation is
seen, and instead we only see the subset of people who received their set, one can use a conflict hypergraph
rather than a conflict graph. The total number of edges in a necessary hypergraph blows up rather quickly,
unfortunately: the size of this representation (and thus the number of mistakes) will be Θ(nk) where k =
maxj∈m kj . Based on our previous observation about the complexity of finding a minimal representation (in
terms of items) consistent with the perceived conflicts, even when there is only one copy of each item, we
suspect this problem may be inherent. We leave the question of whether one can predict the winning sets
of single-minded buyers with a mistake bound and running time which is polynomial in m,n and k (or even
independent of k, for the mistake bound).
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Algorithm UnitDemandPrime: Predicts allocation of order-based allocation rule for unit-demand
players
Let P be an instantiation of PermULearn for n buyers 1, . . . n;
for i = 1 to m do
Let ≻ˆi be an instantiation of the approximate halving algorithm (Section 6) for learning i’s
preference over [m];
for t = 1 to T do
Let I = [m];
Receive St;
for b = 1 to |St| do
Let i = Buyer(b, St, P );
Let jˆi = Buyer(1, I, ≻ˆi); // the predicted choice of item by i
Let Xˆti = {jˆi};
Let I = I \ {jˆi};
Predict Xˆt;
Learn Xt;
if Xt 6= Xˆt then
Let it = FirstMistake(Xt, X̂t, P ); // index of first mistake according to P
Let {jit} = X
t
it ;
Give the constraint jit ≻it jˆit to ≻ˆit ;
if ≻ˆit is infeasible then
Demote(it, P );
Reset ≻ˆit ;
5 Variable prices: additive and unit-demand
The previous sections can be thought of simulating a simple mechanism: according to the mechanism, buyers
have priorities, and in order of that priority, buyers will pick their favorite bundle available. For single-minded
buyers, the priorities could be thought of as a sorting of buyers by their bid, or some other pecking order.
A buyer’s preferences could be thought of as an ordering according to value, or quasilinear utility according
to some fixed prices. We now consider a twist on this original setup: what if, rather than the prices being
fixed, each round was fed a price vector pt along with the subset St, with the assumption that buyers would
now take a bundle to maximize their quasilinear utility with respect to these varying prices? Assume, for
simplicity, that pt ∈ {0, 1, . . . , V }m. Simply running our previous mistake bound algorithm for unit-demand,
additive, or single-minded buyers is tantalizingly simple. Since buyer’s preferences over bundles will change
from one round to the next, this approach fails miserably.
The algorithm which solves the fixed price problem for unit-demand buyers can be thought of in a slightly
different way, which will be useful for solving the problems with variable prices. An equivalent solution to
the problem is to start with a permutation datastructure P to learn the ordering over buyers, and for each
buyer i, a permutation datastructure Pi to learn their preference ordering over items. Whenever a mistake is
made, the algorithm blames the subroutine which is learning some buyer’s preferences (namely, the earliest
buyer for which we made a mistake). If this causes their subroutine to become infeasible, it must be the
case that the buyer needs to be demoted in the larger ordering, so we demote the buyer and restart their
subroutine. Then, the total mistake bound for the algorithm will be n2MB, where MB is the mistake
bound for the subroutines (because each buyer can be demoted at most n times, and there are at most MB
mistakes for a buyer at each position). This intuition (running a global algorithm with subroutines for each
buyer’s preferences) is our starting point for constructing mistake-bound learning algorithms for variable
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Algorithm AdditiveVariable: MB algorithm predicting Xt1, . . .X
t
n; additive buyers under order ≻
P = InitPerm;
Let v¯i(j) = V ; vi(j) = 0;
for t = 1 to T do
Receive St, pt;
Let X̂ti = ∅; I
′ = [m];
Let v̂ti(j) =
v¯i(j)+vi(j)
2 ;
for b = 1 to |St| do
Let i = Buyer(b, St, P ); *Consider the bth-ranked buyer of St according to P*
Let Xti = {j ∈M |v̂i(j) > p
t(j)} and I ′ = I ′ \Xti ;
Predict X̂t1, . . . , X̂
t
n;
Learn Xt1, . . . , X
t
n;
if Xt 6= X̂t then
Let it = FirstMistake(Xt, X̂t, P ); *index of first mistake according to P*
if ∃j ∈ Xtit∆X̂
t
it such that vit(j) = vit(j) *∃ item for which binary search is invalid* then
Demote(it, P ), Let vit(j) = 0 and v¯it(j) = V ;
else
* Update the binary searches. *
for each j ∈ X̂tit \X
t
it do
Set vit(j) = v̂it(j);
for each j ∈ Xtit \ X̂
t
it do
Set v¯it(j) = v̂it(j);
prices. We begin by designing an algorithm for additive buyers, which gives some intuition for the case of
unit-demand. We assume, for simplicity, there are no ties for a buyer’s most-preferred bundle at any set of
prices. All results can be extended to allow ties assuming buyers break ties consistently.
5.1 Additive
Suppose in each round t, our input is a subset of buyers present St and a price vector pt. The algorithm A
we are trying to simulate is composed of two parts, ≻, a priority over buyers, and vi(j) for each buyer i ∈ B,
and j ∈ I, corresponding to the value buyer i has for item j. On a given subset and price vector pair, A will
offer all items to buyer i ∈ St who is first in ≻, who will take all items such that vi(j) > pt(j). Then, the
remaining items are offered to the remaining buyers i′ ∈ St, in order of ≻, who will do the same.
Our algorithm will predict an allocation of item X̂t1, . . . , X̂
t
n. If the allocation is wrong, the correct
allocation Xt1, . . . , X
t
n is shown to our algorithm. We wish, for arbitrary price vectors and subsets, to
minimize the total number of days on which we make prediction errors.
The argument of correctness for Algorithm AdditiveVariable (below) is somewhat more complex than in
the previous sections. As before, we need to show that the algorithm never tells P to push down a buyer
when it should not. The condition for this is slightly more complicated, however. That is, the infeasibility
of the binary search for vi(j) is proof that this buyer cannot be above all of the buyers below him according
to P . It is important that the first error according to Permutation(P ) (and only this error) is the one used
to update the model: this avoids an earlier error in the ordering Pt (or an error in an earlier binary search
vi(j)) placing incorrect constraints on lower buyers. To this end, let FirstMistake(X,X
′, P ) denote the
first i, according to P , for which Xi 6= X ′i. Let V be the maximum valuation any buyer has for any item.
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Thm 5.1. Algorithm AdditiveVariable is an O(log(V )mn2) mistake-bound learning algorithm for the problem
of predicting subsets of quasilinear additive buyer’s purchases according to ≻ priority with prices pt.
We prove the following lemma as a starting point for Theorem 5.1.
Lemma 5.2. Let buyer it ∈ B be the first mistake in round t. Then, there exists some item j ∈ I for which
one of these statements holds:
1. j /∈ X̂tit , but j ∈ X
t
it , and v̂it(j) < vit(j)
2. j ∈ X̂ i
t
t , but j /∈ X
t
it , and v̂it(j) > vit(j)
3. j ∈ X̂tit , but j /∈ X
t
it , and there is some i
′ such that Loc(P t, it) < Loc(P t, i′) but Loc(≻, it) > Loc(≻, i′).
Proof. A mistake implies either there was some item j /∈ X̂tit but j ∈ X
t
it , or j ∈ X̂
t
it but j /∈ X
t
it .
Consider the first case. Our algorithm did not give item j to buyer it: moreover, it didn’t give item j to
some buyer i′ with higher priority (Loc(P t, i′) < Loc(P t, it)), since buyer it was the first mistake, implying
our estimate of buyer it’s value for item j was too low, which falls into case 1.
If, on the other hand, our algorithm allocated item j to buyer it, but buyer it was not awarded item j,
then either buyer it’s value for item j is less than the price (and our estimate v̂it(j) was too high, implying
case 2), or some buyer i′ with higher priority w.r.t ≻ took item j before buyer it. In this case, since buyer it
was the first mistake, this implies Loc(P t, it) < Loc(P t, i′) but Loc(≻, it) > Loc(≻, i′), implying case 3.
Now, we prove Theorem 5.1.
Proof. Along the lines of our previous proofs, we will show our algorithm maintains two invariants:
1. For any buyer i, for each item j, at each time t, the binary search for vi(j) has been given only accurate
upper and lower bounds for any permutation ≻′ such that i has not been demoted in ≻′ from ≻̂
t
(but
some other buyers may be demoted). That is, if buyer i’s precedence does not decrease, any vi(j)s
which would be consistent with ≻′ and the observations are consistent with the binary searches and
≻̂
t
.
2. Any buyer it demoted in Pt has some buyer i
′ such that Loc(P t, it) < Loc(P t, i′) but Loc(≻, i′) <
Loc(≻, it).
We begin with the first invariant. It is satisfied prior to any constraints being added to any buyer’s binary
searches. Now, suppose it is true until time t: all constraints are accurate w.r.t ≻̂
t
and any ≻′ such that i
has not been demoted from ≻̂t to ≻′ but other buyers may have been demoted. If, at time t, i gets another
constraint added to her binary searches, this implies either this constraint is correct or buyer i needs to be
demoted, by Lemma 5.2. Thus, if buyer i is not demoted (as is the case for ≻′), this new constraint (and so
all the constraints) in her binary searches are valid.
Now, we prove the second invariant. The invariant is true at the beginning of the algorithm prior to any
buyer being pushed downwards. Now, consider some time t, and assume this invariant holds until time t.
The only case of interest is when one of buyer it’s binary searches is infeasible and she is demoted.
Due to invariant 1, we know that all the constraints buyer it has received until time t are valid at her
position in ≻̂
t
(or any earlier position), since buyer it’s binary searches are reset whenever buyer it is pushed
down. Since she is the first mistake, by Lemma 5.2, it is either the case that the current constraint being
added is true with respect to her vit(j)s and her position (or an earlier position), or she must occur later in
the ordering. Thus, all the constraints in her binary searches are correct with respect to her current position
(or any earlier one) in the ordering. Since there are some vit(j)s which are consistent with the observations,
but not the set of constraints, it must be the case that buyer it occurs later in the ordering.
Now, we show the mistake bound. If a mistake is made, some buyer it either updates her binary searches
or is demoted. At most log(V ) binary search updates can occur for a given item and buyer before the binary
search becomes infeasible and she is demoted. Thus, there can be at most m log(V ) mistakes resulting in
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Algorithm UnitVariable: MB algorithm predicting Xt1, . . .X
t
n; unit-demand buyers, order ≻
P = InitPerm;
Let R̂i be an instance of an ellipsoid algorithm w. unknowns vi(j) for all i ∈ B, j ∈ I;
for t = 1 to T do
Receive St, pt;
Let X̂ti = ∅ an I
′ = [m];
for b = 1 to |St| do
Let i = Buyer(b, St, P );
Let v̂i ∈ Rm be the center estimated by R̂i;
Let ĵi = argmaxj∈I′ v̂i(j)− p
t(j); // prediction for i w.r.t. prices, est. values, remaining items
Let Xti = {ĵi} if v̂i(ĵi)− p
t(ĵi) > 0 or ∅ otherwise;
Let I ′ = I ′ \Xti ;
Predict X̂t1, . . . , X̂
t
n;
Learn Xt1, . . . , X
t
n;
if X 6= X̂ then
Let it = FirstMistake(Xt, X̂t, P );
if Xtit = ∅ then
Give the constraint vit(ĵit) < p
t(jit) to R̂it ;
else
Let {jit} = X
t
it ; // The item i
t actually won
if X̂tit = ∅ then
Give the constraint vit(jit) > p
t(jit) to R̂it ;
else
Let X̂tit = {ĵit};
Give the constraint vit(jit)− vit(ĵit) > p
t(jit)− p
t(ĵit) to R̂it ;
if R̂it is infeasible then
Demote(it, P ) and restart R̂it ;
binary search updates for a buyer before she is demoted. By Lemma 3.1 and invariant 2, no buyer is pushed
later in the ordering than she occurs in ≻; thus, there are at most n2 mistakes resulting in demotions. Thus,
in total, there are at most n2m log(V ) many mistakes.
5.2 Unit-Demand
The case of unit-demand buyers is similar to that of additive buyers, though the buyers will no longer have
separable preferences over items: instead, out of a set of available items T at prices pt, buyer i will buy
j = argmaxj∈J [vi(j) − p
t(j)] to maximize his quasilinear utility (assume that there is some consistent tie-
breaking in the event that several items are equally good). So, rather than using binary search for each item
separately, for each buyer, we will run a mistake bound ellipsoid algorithm; whenever a constraint is added,
it will be of the form vi(j)−pt(j) > vi(j′)−pt(j′), where the vi(j)s are variables and the pt(j)s are constants
coming from the online price vectors.
Thm 5.3. Algorithm UnitVariable is an O(n2MB)-mistake bound learner for unit-demand buyers with re-
spect to some order ≻, whereMB is the online mistake bound guarantee of the online classification algorithm.
The main theorem of this section follows from a similar analysis to that of additive buyers in the previous
section, with a twist stemming from the fact that we use the Ellipsoid algorithm as the mistake-bound
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subroutine (with each mistake serving as its separation oracle), rather than binary search for each item
separately. This is similar to the use of the Ellipsoid algorithm by Maass and Turan [1990] for learning a
linear separator. We start by stating a lemma about the mistake bound for this subroutine.
Lemma 5.4. Using the ellipsoid algorithm to learn the collection {vi(j)}j has a mistake bound of O(m2(K+
logm)) so long as each mistake returns a constraint such that its current hypothesis vˆi is no longer feasible,
where K is the maximum precision of the vis.
Proof. We will have m variables corresponding to the valuations of buyer i to each of the m items. The
Ellipsoid algorithmmaintains an ellipsoid that contains the feasible region (the possiblem-tuples of valuations
consistent with observations so far) and proposes as its current hypothesis the center of that ellipsoid. We
use this center as a proposed valuation for buyer i until we make an error involving her. Once we make an
error we identify a violated linear constraint, and we return it to the Ellipsoid algorithm, which then updates
its ellipsoid and hypothesis.
In each iteration (mistake of the algorithm) the volume shrinks multiplicatively by a fraction of 1 − 1
m
.
The initial volume is at most 2O(m(K+logm)). The final volume, assuming that there is a consistent valuation,
is at least 2−O(m(K+logm)). This implies that after at most O(m2(K + logm)) errors we reach a volume
which is too small, and therefore we can declare there is no feasible valuation.
We now state the analogue to Lemma 5.2 for the unit-demand case.
Lemma 5.5. Suppose UnitDemand makes a mistake at time t. Let it be the first mistake (according to ≻̂
t
).
Let ĵit be the item we predicted i
t to win (if any) and jit the item i
t won (if any). Then one of these holds:
1. vit(ĵit)− p
t(ĵit) < 0 < v̂it(ĵit)− p
t(ĵit), or vit(ĵit) < v̂it(ĵit)
2. vit(ĵit)− p
t(ĵit) < vit(jit)− p
t(jit)
3. vit(jit) > v̂it(jit)
4. ĵit was not available (∃i
′ s.t. Loc(P t, it) < Loc(P t, i′) but Loc(≻, it) > Loc(≻, i′).
Proof. Consider a mistake on buyer it. Either it is the case that (a) it bought nothing and we predicted she
bought something, (b) she bought something and we predicted nothing, or (c) we predicted the wrong item.
(a) occurs only when ĵ was no longer available (it needs to be demoted, case 4) or ĵ was too expensive,
vit(ĵ) − p
t(ĵ) < 0 (case 1). (b) can only occur because our estimate of her value of an item was to small
(case 3), since she is the first mistake it cannot be because we predicted that someone earlier took j. (c)
occurs when either ĵ was not available (and i needs a demotion, case 4) or our estimate of utility was wrong
(case 2).
Now, we prove Theorem 5.3.
Proof. We claim the same two invariants are true of Algorithm UnitVariable as were true of Algorithm AdditiveVariable,
since Lemma 5.5 provides the analogous guarantees (namely, that when we make a mistake, we either get
to add a constraint to some ellipsoid algorithm, or we get to demote some buyer). Thus, the algorithm is
correct. Each instantiation of the ellipsoid algorithm makes at most MB mistakes before it is demoted and
restarted, and there are at most n2 demotions total. Thus, a mistake bound of MBn2 in total holds.
6 Discussion
In this paper we present algorithms that from observations of opaque transactions (observing just who wins
and who doesn’t in the case of single-minded buyers, or observing the allocations produced in the case of
additive or unit-demand buyers) can reconstruct both the preferences of the buyers and the mechanism
used by the seller sufficiently well to predict the outcomes of new transactions. We focus on priority-based
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ordered arrival mechanisms on the side of the seller, and commonly-studied classes of valuation functions for
the buyers. It would be interesting to consider this problem in the context of other mechanisms and other
observation models as well. Note that for mechanisms such as VCG (producing a social-welfare-maximizing
allocation) certain complications arise: for instance even in the case that all buyer valuations are known,
finding the allocation produced can be NP-complete if buyers are single-minded. So one would want to focus
on settings where at least when everything is known the prediction problem is easy.
A concrete open question is whether one can improve the mistake bounds given in the previous sec-
tions with computationally efficient algorithms. While the single-minded mistake bound has a matching
information-theoretic lower bound4, there may be room for improving the unit-demand results. Information
theoretically, there are matching upper and lower bounds for several of these problems. As a warm-up, we
first present the single item case (where we do have an efficient algorithm for the matching the upper bound).
We state the formal theorem below.
Thm 6.1. The problem of learning the allocation made by an ordered arrival mechanism with a single item
has a mistake bound M = Θ(n log(n)), and there is an algorithm with this mistake bound that runs in
polynomial time.
For the lower bound, an adversary can present subsets of size 2 and essentially just simulate merge-sort.
To start, for i = 1, . . . , n/2, the adversary presents subset {2i− 1, 2i}, and tells the algorithm it has made a
mistake (regardless of its prediction), causing n/2 mistakes. In general, given n/L sorted lists of size L, the
adversary pairs the lists together and then for each pair runs through the merging process (presenting the
subset consisting of the top element in each list, telling the algorithm it has made a mistake whatever its
prediction is, and popping off the true largest element). This maintains consistency with an overall ordering
and creates at least L mistakes per pair, or again n/2 mistakes total for the round. There are log(n) rounds,
leading to an overall lower bound of Ω(n logn).
We can construct a computationally efficiently algorithm which matches this information-theoretic lower
bound using two ideas. First, each mistake gives us a new pair of agents (i, j) for which we learn i ≻ j but
Loc(i, P t) < Loc(j, P t) (the true winner i has higher priority than every other i′ ∈ St, and in particular, the
estimated winner j). Second, as mentioned previously, Karzanov and Khachiyan [1991] given an efficient
sampling algorithm which samples uniformly a consistent linear extension of a partial order.
Then, consider the following prediction algorithm. Consider a new subset St. Take a single sample ≻?
using the algorithm of Karzanov and Khachiyan [1991], and predict the winner is jt = Buyer(1, St,≻?).
If a mistake is made, and it is the winner, add the set of constraints it ≻ j for all j ∈ St to the partial
order. We claim that each constraint added to the partial order over the life of the algorithm is correct (they
are added because a mistake is proof of the constraint). Second, when a mistake is made, the number of
consistent linear extensions shrinks (multiplicatively) by at least 14 in expectation. This fact follows from
the fact that if there is some kt whose probability of winning at time t is at least 12 (where this probability is
taken over the set of consistent linear extensions), there is probability at least 12 of our algorithm predicting
kt. If kt is incorrect, then all permutations where kt is first amongst St are inconsistent after adding the
new constraints, cutting the number of consistent linear extensions in half. Another winner is predicted with
probability at most 12 , and the set of linear extensions only shrinks. Thus, by an analysis similar to the
halving algorithm, after Θ(n log(n)) mistakes, there is only one consistent linear extension, and it is ≻.
The case of unit-demand buyers also has matching information-theoretic lower and upper bounds, though
we do not know of a polynomial-time algorithm which achieves this mistake bound.
Thm 6.2. For the fixed-price problem of learning an ordered allocation mechanism over unit-demand buyers,
the mistake bound is Θ(mn log(m)) (assuming m = Ω(log(n))).
4Suppose there are
n(n−1)
2
items (one for each pair of buyers). In each round t, the adversary presents the algorithm with
St which contains a pair of buyers that has never been presented before. The algorithm needs to predict whether one or both
of the buyers will be satisfied (guessing whether both buyers are both interested in their “shared” item or not). Regardless
of the algorithm’s choice, the adversary will say that was a mistake: this yields a consistent set of conflicts and will force the
algorithm to make Ω(n2) mistakes.
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The lower bound for this problem is similar to the previous argument. The generalization uses n buyers,
the first m of which are “dummy” buyers and have favorite items a1, . . . , am. We can use these first buyers
to control which items are available for the true buyers. Then, each example St will contain m−2 “dummy”
buyers (who take all but just 2 items af , ag) and one true buyer i. Then, the algorithm needs to decide
which of af or ag the true buyer will select. This will be repeated for each pair of items and each non-dummy
buyer. Thus, the algorithm is solving n−m separate instances of sorting m items (for each buyer), and so
the problem has a lower bound of Ω(mn log(m)) mistakes.
Without computational constraints, we can construct an algorithm with a matching mistake bound. The
algorithm will maintain a list of consistent permutations over buyers (and, for each of those permutations
over buyers, the consistent permutations for each buyer over items). Given a new subset St, the algorithm
predicts the most likely allocation (where each consistent predictor votes once). Since there are n! ∗ (m!)n
many initial hypotheses (an ordering over buyers and, for each buyer, an ordering over items), the halving
algorithm will make O(n log(n) + nm log(m)) mistakes.
It is not clear how to make this algorithm computationally efficient without increasing the mistake bound:
unlike in the single-item case, there isn’t a clear culprit to our mistake. In the single-item case, we can add
another constraint to our partial order, generating a refined partial order. In the unit-demand case, a mistake
could be made either because the understanding of some individual’s preferences are wrong, or because they
were given an incorrect priority. In our implementation, we blame the understanding of a buyer’s preferences
for as long as possible. Once a buyer i’s preference learner is infeasible, the algorithm has proof that some
buyer j ∈ St has higher rank than i (rather than one particular j ∈ St). We do not know how to maintain
this information as a partial order, or in some other compact way that allows us to sample efficiently from the
linear extensions of our observations. We leave it as an open question whether or not there is an algorithm A
which predicts an ordered arrival mechanism with fixed prices for unit-demand buyers whose mistake bound
is O(nm log(m)) with poly(n,m) computational complexity.
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